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Abstract—A new development of smart-home systems is to
use mobile apps to control IoT devices across a Home Area
Network (HAN). Those systems tend to rely on the Wi-Fi
router to authenticate other devices; as verified in our study,
IoT vendors tend to trust all devices connected to the HAN.
This treatment exposes them to the attack from malicious apps,
particularly those running on authorized phones, which the
router does not have information to control, as confirmed in
our measurement study. Mitigating this threat cannot solely rely
on IoT manufacturers, which may need to change the hardware
on the devices to support encryption, increasing the cost of the
device, or software developers who we need to trust to implement
security correctly.
In this work, we present a new technique to control the com-
munication between the IoT devices and their apps in a unified,
backward-compatible way. Our approach, called Hanguard, does
not require any changes to the IoT devices themselves, the IoT
apps or the OS of the participating phones. Hanguard achieves
a fine-grained, per-app protection through bridging the OS-level
situation awareness and the router-level per-flow control: each
phone runs a non-system userspace Monitor app to identify the
party that attempts to access the protected IoT device and inform
the router through a control plane of its access decision; the router
enforces the decision on the data plane after verifying whether
the phone should be allowed to talk to the device. Hanguard uses
a role-based access control (RBAC) schema which leverages type
enforcement (TE) and multi-category security (MCS) primitives to
define highly flexible access control rules. We implemented our
design over both Android and iOS (> 95% of mobile OS market
share) and a popular router. Our study shows that Hanguard is
both efficient and effective in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has
brought in a new wave of technological advances in home
automation. According to Gartner [11], 6.4 billion IoT devices
will be online in 2016, among which a significant portion are
smart-home systems like smart thermostats [32], [15], fitness
trackers, refrigerators, etc., and the number is expected to go
above 20 billion by 2020. Examples of such devices include:
the Belkin NetCam [5], a camera for streaming surveillance
video to a mobile phone; the iBaby monitor [17], a device for
remote babysitting; the Family Hub refrigerator [41], which
enables online checking of the fridge’s contents. Increasingly,
these devices are designed to communicate not only with
their servers in the cloud but also with other IoT devices
and the user’s phone over the Home Area Network (HAN),
which is typically built around a Wi-Fi router. For example,
Nest Protect Fire sensors [31] are capable of propagating an
alarm across multiple sensors installed in different rooms of a
house. For the convenience of management, such interconnected
IoT equipment often relies on the secure connections of
HAN (Wi-Fi authentication) for protection and trusts all the
computing systems on the same network. This treatment,
however, completely exposes the device to the attacks from
compromised local systems, a threat becoming increasingly
realistic.
Menace of local threats. Indeed, it has been reported that
high-profile WiFi-enabled smart home devices, including the
WeMo Switch and motion sensor [54], [87], [99], [112], [113],
Belkin NetCam [6], baby monitoring devices [116], [115],
[114] and smart light bulbs [80], are all vulnerable to a local
attack: an adversary within the same HAN is shown to be able
to control those devices or steal sensitive user information,
e.g., live video streams [6], from them. Several studies further
reveal that this is possible since such devices have poor—or
no–authentication mechanisms [100], [20], [95], [106], [88],
[82], [83], [38], [101], [38] and therefore easily fall prey to a
local attacker.
Defending against such attacks becomes particularly chal-
lenging when the IoT devices are controlled by phones: once
the same phone also carries malware (even when the app
has nothing but the network privilege), protecting the device
it controls becomes impossible at the network level, as the
phone is completely legitimate to access the device though the
malicious app running on it is not. Given the high smartphone
penetration rates [103], the millions of available mobile
applications on both official and third-party markets [35], and
the ease of distribution of such applications 1, devices that
can be reached through mobile apps can also become an easy
target to adversaries. Unfortunately, such adversaries are not
1Android applications can be self-signed.
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only realistic; they are on the rise [1], [24], [45]. Because of
that they become the main subject of study of many other
academic works [61], [124], [81], [122] while concerns are
also raised on public communication channels [47], [2], [25].
In our research we verified that IoT vendors tend to trust the
local network (Section III-B). This makes them vulnerable to
a mobile adversary as we illustrate with attacks on real-world
IoT devices, including the WeMo Switch, WeMo Motion, WeMo
in.sight.AC1 and My N3rd. The demos of these attacks can be
found on a private website [13].
Addressing the issue here cannot solely rely on device
manufacturers: unfortunately business factors such as time
to market and keeping the cost of the device low but also
operational factors such as low power consumption, lead to
the production of devices without encryption capabilities [104].
In such cases, response to threats can only be reactive and
it would entail manufacturing a new version of the device
which would still leave users with the old version susceptible
to attacks. To make things worse, device manufacturers can
be slow in responding [10], [105] to security and privacy
threats. Router vendors have already identified this threat. New
hubs and routers pushed onto the market are increasingly
armed with various IoT protections (e.g. Microsoft Azure IoT
hub [4], Google’s OnHub router [36]. Integrating protection
and management capabilities in the router has significant
benefits as the infrastructure is already in place in most
households and it enables unified policy management. However,
as mentioned above, security control at the router level cannot
succeed without knowledge of the OS-level situation within
an authorized mobile phone, particularly whether a request to
a target device comes from its official app or an unauthorized
party. Fundamentally, a practical solution to the problem needs
to bridge the gap between the OS-level observation (apps
making network connections on a phone) and the network-layer
view (requests from the phone for accessing an IoT device),
with minimum modifications on the HAN infrastructure and
all the systems involved.
Situation-aware device access protection. A simple solution
to the problem is just inferring the identity of the app
communicating with an IoT device according to its traffic
fingerprint. This approach, however, is unreliable and can be
easily defeated by, for example, a repackaged app that closely
mimics the authorized program’s communication patterns. Also,
individual apps’ fingerprints need to be reliably generated,
deployed and continuously updated, and further to be checked
on the router against each communication flow it observes,
which adds cost to both the router developer and the user. In
this paper, we present a different approach, a new technique
that achieves fine-grained, situation-aware access control of
IoT devices over a home area network. Our approach, called
Hanguard, distributes its protection logic across mobile phones
and the Wi-Fi router for jointly constructing the full picture of
an IoT access attempt during runtime, which is then utilized
to control the access on the network layer. More specifically,
on the phone side, the information about the app making
network connections is collected and passed to the router; on
the router side, security policies are enforced to ensure that
only an authorized app can touch a set of functionalities the
device provides. In this way, malware on network-authenticated
phones can no longer endanger the operations of the IoT
devices, even when the IoT devices are not equipped with
proper authentication and encryption protection.
Hanguard is designed to directly work on the existing HAN
infrastructure, without modifying mobile operating systems or
IoT devices. To deploy the system, one only needs to install
a Monitor app with non-system privileges on mobile phones
and update the firmware of the Wi-Fi router with a security
patch. A key technical challenge here is how to gather situation
information (processes making network connections) on mobile
phones, which is not given to a third-party userspace app on
both Android and iOS. Although all these systems provide
VPN support, the app using the service still cannot observe the
process generating traffic and will significantly slow down the
network communication of the whole system (Section IV-B).
To address the issue, we leverage side channel information
for lightweight discovery of runtime situation on Android and
utilize the VPN to only mark out authorized apps’ traffic on iOS
(Section IV-B). Such information is then delivered to the router
through a separate control channel, which is synchronized with
the traffic generated by the app (over a data channel) and used
by the router to determine whether the communication should
be allowed to proceed.
We implemented our design over both Android and iOS
which cover more than 95% of the mobile OS marketshare [18],
and a TP-Link WDR4300v1 Wi-Fi router. Our evaluation shows
that Hanguard easily identified and blocked all unauthorized
attempts to access IoT devices with negligible overhead in the
common case. (Section V).
Our contributions. The contributions of the paper are sum-
marized as follows:
• New understanding. We found that IoT vendors treat the HAN
as a trusted environment. This treatment leaves the devices
vulnerable to a new type of confused-deputy problem, when a
malicious app utilizes an authorized phone to gain unauthorized
access to IoT devices through the HAN. We further demonstrate
the grave consequences of such attacks on four real IoT devices.
Our findings highlight the need for proactive protection built
within the HAN.
• New access control mechanisms. We have utilized type
enforcement and multi-category security principles to design a
new fine-grained access control mechanism for WiFi devices.
• New system techniques. Hanguard employs a new software-
defined networking (SDN) approach applied on existing infras-
tructure of home area networks: it features a new controller
system architecture distributed across HAN phones and the
router. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to use
phones as Monitors for local area SDN. Our design can have
applications in enterprise settings, peer-to-peer networks and
others.
• Implementation and evaluation. We implemented Hanguard
on both Android and iOS phones, and a commercial router,
and evaluated it against attacks on real-world IoT devices and
on various performance metrics. Our study demonstrates the
practicality and efficacy of the new system.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II motivate the work and Section III presents our
study on popular smart-home devices; Section IV presents
Hanguard and Section V our evaluation; Section VI conducts
a security analysis of our system and Section VII discusses
Hanguard.; Section VIII reviews related prior research and
Section IX concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION
IoT on HAN. Home automation systems today are increasingly
connected to the Internet and to each other. Examples of such
devices include smart cameras [5], [8], [3], [30], [14], various
sensors [31], [54], [23], [7], [33], [39], smart door bells [40],
[43] (with HD video, motion sensing and bidirectional audio
capabilities), smart cooking appliances like Mr Coffee [26]
(for remote control of coffee brewing), smart gardening
products such as OpenSprinkler [37] (for remote management
of irrigation) and more. These devices are typically connected
to a HAN through its Wi-Fi router. To make this happen, one
uses a smartphone to communicate with a temporary access
point created by the IoT device to configure the device, entering
login credentials for the device to establish a Wi-Fi connection
with the router. Through the connection, the device can talk to
its cloud service and receive commands from the service and
the user’s phone. A conventional way to do that is to let the
phone control the device through the cloud service, even when
both the phone and the IoT devices are within the same HAN.
Although this treatment simplifies the IoT-control mecha-
nism, restricting an authorized app to always communicate
with the IoT device in the same way regardless of whether
they are on the same network, it comes with availability and
performance penalties. In fact this has already caused a lot
of trouble: e.g., the Ring doorbell [68] is reported to take
30 seconds to deliver the notification to the user in some
cases; Canary [63] and Scout alarm [22] was found to be
unable to send out an alarm once the Internet is down. Also
users of the Lutron bridge [9] and the Chamberlain garage
opener [78] complained that they need the Internet to turn on
the light and open the garage door. In response to such concerns,
support for direct phone-device communication through the
HAN becomes a requirement. For example Lightify claims
that from version 1.0.3b11, its users will be able to control
lights offline [21]. Another prominent example is Samsung’s
Smarthings—a leading IoT hub: Smartthings reported their
plans to support local computation, which enables its systems
to work together even without Internet [34]; in fact apps and
devices which previously existed in the cloud, are now moved
to the local hub [46].
Smart-home security. The popularity of the smart-home
devices also comes with new security risks. As mentioned
earlier, several studies show that most IoT devices today are not
adequately protected, leaving the door widely open to different
kinds of attacks. A prominent example is Shodan [42], [95],
[106], a search engine for IoT, which has discovered a lot of
vulnerable webcams online (ports made open to the public and
with only weak authentication protection), exposing private
information such as video streams of a sleeping baby [85].
Moreove, a recent Mirai-based botnet, took advantage of smart-
home devices weak authentication to launch a massive DDoS
attack in the US [16]. In addition to such remote attacks, smart-
home devices are also found to be subjected to local threats. It
has been reported that through a laptop or a desktop running
in the same network, one can gain unauthorized access to the
Wemo Switch and Motion sensor [87], [99], [112], [113], the
Belkin NetCam [6], the Philips Hue smart light bulbs [80], etc.
Our research further shows that such attacks can be launched
from a malicious app running on a smartphone and the problem
becomes particularly serious when the phone is authorized to
access the IoT device while the app is not (Section III-B).
Such mobile malware have been established as one of
the most prevalent cyber-threats. On the one hand some
reports show low mobile device infection rates by malicious
applications in the US [93], but on the other hand these reports
are somewhat variable [74]. Furthermore, there are increasingly
more potentially harmful applications in other parts of the world
e.g. in China. More importantly, the mere presence of mobile
malware given the ease of their distribution (self-signed apps,
third-party markets) and the rise of mobile malware [1], [24],
[45], render it a security threat. Mobile malware became the
main subject of study of many previous academic works which
have already illustrated the prevalence and severity of this
problem [61], [124], [81], [122].
Need for proactive device-independent protection. One way
to mitigate the mobile adversary on home IoT devices is
by fixing all the security vulnerabilities on the IoT devices.
However, it is generally accepted that fixing the security issues
within embedded devices is difficult [10], [105], [104]. Unlike
traditional computers, whose security-critical vulnerabilities
are often addressed through patching, no clear path is available
for patching and upgrading IoT devices once they leave
the manufacturer’s warehouse. The problem is caused by a
lack of computing power on some devices or the patching
infrastructure, or in some other cases, by the use of third-party
hardware, software and other resources, which are hard to patch
by the device manufacturers themselves. Consider for example,
the case of the square dongle which is used for secure payments.
Driven by time to market goals and low cost requirements,
the vendor shipped the earlier version of the dongle with
no hardware support for encryption [104]. To fix the problem,
Square had to produce a new dongle device. Moreover, previous
work [98] demonstrated that various Bluetooth medical devices
also suffered from similar issues, lacking authentication and
encryption. As a result of such practices, many faulty systems
are still in use even after their problems have been reported,
leaving them even more vulnerable since their weaknesses
already become public knowledge. Lastly, many reports indicate
that these problems extend to IoT devices [20], [95], [106],
[88], [82], [83], [38], [101], [38]. We believe that the answer
to this challenge for smart home WiFi devices, is a network-
level protection that utilizes distributed app-level awareness
from existing user-managed devices. The system should be
deployable on the existing HAN infrastructure; it should also
enable access control management of smart-home devices
and safeguard them and their users even when the devices
themselves are vulnerable.
III. OPERATIONS AND EXISTING TRUST MODEL
We performed an analysis of devices’ operations, their HAN
trust model and the implications stemming from a mobile
adversary. Our findings informed Hanguard’s design decisions.
Methodology. One approach for our study would be to
investigate the IoT devices’ firmware. That would entail—after
identifying such devices–finding images of their firmware or,
for each device, buying the device and extracting its firmware.
Subsequently, each firmware needs to be analyzed, which is a
non trivial task [69]. However, most of these devices are now
controlled by mobile apps. Thus their control mechanisms can
be examined by analyzing the apps instead of the firmware.
Note that, our approach has multiple benefits over analyzing
firmware: (1) we can easily acquire Android apps, (2) there
is no monetary cost, (3) it is generally easier and faster to
analyze mobile apps than an embedded device’s firmware.
The most straightforward way to find the Android apps of
the IoT devices, is to search for them at Google Play using
keywords such as “home automation” and “internet of things”,
which, however, turned out to be less effective: through manual
inspections of search outcomes, we found that many apps
identified this way were not related to any IoT systems and
in the meantime, popular IoT apps fell through cracks. Our
solution is to crawl iotlist.co, a popular site for discovering
IoT products. From the list, the crawler we ran collected the
meta-data of 353 products 2, including “Title”, “Description”,
“Product Url”, “Purchase Url” and others. Such data was further
manually checked to identify a list of package names for the
official apps of these devices. Searching Google Play using
the list, our crawler downloaded the apps and their meta-data
from the Play store. Out of the 353 products we found that
63% (223) of them have apps on Google Play, 2% (7) are
iOS only and the rest are mostly unfinished products (listed on
kickstarter.com and indiegogo.com) or are no longer available.
This indicates that indeed most IoT devices today are controlled
by smartphones. The APK files of these apps were decompiled
(using apktool [49]) and their .smali 3 and manifest files 4
were extracted. Further, each app’s machine code was converted
to Java code using dex2jar [12] for manual analysis.
2all listed products at the time of the study
3smali is a human readable representation of Android bytecode (.dex).
4A manifest file indicates what security permissions an app requires and
various application building blocks.
A. Operations of Smart-Home Devices
To better understand the operations of smart home devices,
we manually went through (1) the meta-data of the collected
products, (2) their online documentations and websites, and
(3) through their apps’ source code when available. Figure 1a
illustrates our manual categorization of the IoT products based
on their functionality. Note that the Wearables category (31%)
embodies mostly fitness and location trackers, smartwatches
and personal medical devices. We call such devices personal
devices; these commonly use Bluetooth to connect to a
smartphone app. Previous work has already studied the security
of personal devices, they found problems with encryption and
authentication and proposed solutions [98], [72]. From the
figure, we can also see that most of the listed IoT devices
(55%) are smart home automation/entertainment/security/hub
systems, which are the focus of our study (see Appendix X for
a complete categorization). We call these shared devices. Such
devices could directly benefit from an access control scheme
built within the HAN. Previous work on shared devices, was
focused on a single IoT integration platform (hub) [75], [76].
In our research we wanted to identify the workflow of the
WiFi-enabled smart-home devices irrespective of the existence
or non existence of a proprietary integration platform (hub). We
identified 2 high level phases of operation: the setup phase and
the communication phase. During the setup phase, the system
provides the user with the means of communicating the WiFi
credentials to the smart device. Then the smart device uses the
credentials to authenticate itself to the local network. Figure 1b
illustrates the most common setup scenario among the WiFi
devices. In Step 1, the smart device creates a micro access
point and advertises its SSID. This is is usually initiated by the
user pushing a specific sequence of buttons on the device. In
Steps 2,3 and 4, the user utilizes a smart phone app to directly
connect to the device. The app searches for the advertised SSID
and guides the user to select the device network. Once the
smartphone connects to the micro-access point, the app asks
the user to input the HAN WiFi credentials to the app (Step 5).
Then the app transfers the credentials to the device (Step 6). In
Step 7,8, and 9, the device tears down the micro-access point
and attempts to connect to the HAN WiFi network. The user
is notified through the app regarding the result of the attempt
(Step 10). Once the device is connected to the HAN the app
asks the user to connect her phone to the HAN as well to
interact with the device (Step 11). Other IoT vendors choose
to complete the setup phase through a tethered mode: the user
is expected to connect her smartphone with the device through
a cable (e.g. audio jack, usb). The credentials are passed by
the app using the tethered channel. Evidently the setup phase
can be cumbersome to the users but is expected to happen
mostly once per device. Some vendors do try to streamline this
process. For example some devices use a no-network mode. In
this case the user could input the WiFi credentials to the app
and then show the smartphone screen to an optical sensor on
the device. The device recognizes and parses the credentials.
During the communication phase, the user can send com-
2%3%5%
8%
9%
13%
29%
31%
Automotives (2%)
Gardening (3%)
Home Entertainment
Hubs
Other
Home Security
Home Automation & Appliances
Wearables
(a) IoT Products Functionality Categorization. (b) Setup Phase of WiFi Devices. (c) Communication Phase of WiFi Devices.
Fig. 1: Operations of Smart Home Devices.
mands to the smart device through the app. This can happen
through 2 main avenues as illustrated in Figure 1c. The app
can (a) attempt to connect to the cloud service of the device.
In this case the cloud service is responsible for authenticating
the app and relaying the command to the appropriate IoT
device. Alternatively (b) the app connects directly to the device
through WiFi. Obviously the former requires constant Internet
connection and comes with latency penalties. Thus vendors
(e.g. Samsung Smartthings) are increasingly turning into using
the cloud only for remote control and turning to WiFi for local
control.
B. HAN Trust Model of Smart-Home Devices
In our research, we further investigated the trust model of
WiFi smart-home devices. Prior research already demonstrated
that the interaction between smartphone apps and the cloud is
alarmingly unguarded [66], [119]. On the other hand, the local
communication between the apps and the devices is not as
well understood. In fact it is unclear whether app developers
and IoT device manufacturers treat the local network and
everybody connected to it as trusted entities and whether such
treatments leave the devices susceptible to attacks from both
local adversaries and remote adversaries that gain access to
the HAN. Moreover, even though it has been reported that IoT
devices come with serious problems [20], [95], [106], [88],
[82], [83], [38], [101], [38], little has been done to understand
the security risks stemming from malicious mobile apps. This is
particularly important since, IoT devices are controlled by apps
which send commands either through the cloud or the local
network. Here, we aim to bridge these gaps in knowledge. Our
findings build on to the existing evidence which collectively
support the need for a unified security and management system
built within the HAN to safeguard today’s smart-home devices.
To facilitate our manual analysis we further built a pars-
ing tool which simply looks for the presence of password
requests in the layout files of the apps. Android enables
developers to create the layout of a screen statically using
xml layout files. In such files, one can specify a hint to a
text field using android:hint="my_hint". Developers
can also explicitly associate a field with a password using
android:password="true" for API level 3 and earlier,
or android:inputType="textPassword" for later ver-
sions. Our tool looks in all xml files under the layout directories
of an app under analysis for the presence of these definitions;
where my_hint we used password and passphrase.
Our study aims to achieve the following goals: (a) Find
out whether vendors and developers of WiFi smart home
devices/apps erroneously treat the home area network as a
trusted environment; (b) Find out how easy or hard it is for a
mobile adversary to take advantage of unguarded local smart
home devices in practice.
HAN Trust Model. We performed a statistical significance
test focused on the following null hypothesis (N0): HAN
apps with only remote connections are equally likely to
perform authentication compared to HAN apps with only local
connections. To answer this question we separated our collected
IoT apps into two groups. Apps with only remote connections
and apps with only local WiFi connections. We used 55 unique
Android applications with WiFi/Internet only connections to
HAN IoT devices. A full list of the apps selected for HAN
trust model analysis is provided in the Appendix X.
To separate the apps into the two groups, we manually
went through (1) their online documentations and websites, (2)
public forums, and (3) their Java Android code. We found that
22 (40%) do perform some internet socket connection with
local discovered devices or fixed local IPs 5. 25 (45%) were
found without local WiFi connections, 5 (9%) we could not
determine, for 2(4%) decompilation failed, and 1 (2%) was
by that time removed from Google Play. For each of the 2
sets (local; no local) we analyzed them further to discover
whether they perform any authentication. For the ones that
perform only remote connections we used our parsing tool
that searches for password requests in the layout files of the
apps. We found that out of 25 apps, 16 do request a password
and 9 do not. Since, our tool could miss password requests
that are not defined statically, we manually went through the
9 apps flagged as performing no authentication and found
that actually a password was used in some respect in all 9 of
them. In particular, 7 of them were web apps using libraries
such as the cordova library that allows developing apps
with web technologies (e.g. Javascript). The remaining two
were constructing the user interface element responsible for
the password field in code.
For the 22 apps with local WiFi connections we could not
5Note that if the connection is construed to be performed for the setup
phase, we do not regard it as a local connection.
simply use the above tool since it would reveal little to no
information on whether a password is used for a connection
with the IoT device or the cloud. Thus we manually went
through their code looking for network API calls responsible
for local connections (e.g. creation of sockets connecting to
local IPs, or UPnP discovery). We examined the calls to such
APIs and found that 9 of the apps do not authenticate to the
IoT device.
To determine whether apps with local connections are less
likely to perform authentication one could perform a χ2-test of
independence. A challenge we had was the small absolute
number of relevant available apps derived from iotlist.co.
Because of this, the χ2-test of independence might not derive
statistically significant results. To overcome this we used the
Fisher’s exact test [77]. This is a common approach to derive
statistically significant results when the sample size is small.
We leveraged a tool by Carlson et. al. [65] to perform such a
test on the our null hypothesis (N0). A 2-sided P value less
than 0.05 was considered significant.
The test yielded a 2-sided P-value of 0.00036 < 0.05 and
thus we can reject N0. Therefore, we can now confidently
say that HAN apps with local connections are less likely to
get authenticated by smart-home devices. This validates an
important intuition that IoT vendors consider the HAN to be a
trusted environment. However, given the fact that phones are an
integral part of such a network and that phones can carry self-
signed apps from third-party markets, this treatment becomes
detrimental to the security of HAN IoT devices. This result
further highlights the need for an access control system that
can be integrated in home area networks with minimal changes
to the existing infrastructure, that is backward compatible,
independent of vendor and developer practices and that allows
the users the flexibility to manage and control who should
communicate to which device.
HAN mobile adversary. The previous finding is particularly
alarming. Next we attempt to illustrate how a weak mobile
adversary can take advantage of this problematic trust model
and compromise smart home devices. Towards this end,
we cherry-picked four devices with local connections and
authentication issues and attempted to perform real-world,
practical attacks. The devices we picked are listed on Table I.
Our targets include the WeMo Switch and WeMo Motion [54],
the WeMo in.sight.AC1 [53], and My N3rd [27]. The WeMo
devices are examples of popular plug-and-play devices. Just on
Android, the official app of the WeMo devices was download
100,000–500,000 times 6. Note that all the WeMo devices are
manufactured by a single vendor. By focusing on three WeMo
devices we want to showcase how an erroneous trust model by
a vendor can spread across various of its devices. This suggests
that trusting the local network was a design decision and not
an implementation issue manifesting in an isolated device.
My N3rd, while not yet popular, it is chosen to showcase a
new category of do-it-yourself (DIY) devices. It allows one
6This is a conservative number as people can download the app
from alternative Android app markets or from iTunes for iOS devices.
TABLE I: Example devices picked for real-world attack
demonstrations.
Target Device Description # App Installations
WeMo Switch Actuator 100K - 500K
WeMo Motion Sensor 100K - 500K
WeMo Insight Switch Actuator 100K - 500K
My N3rd Actuator 100 - 500
to connect it to any other device enabling turning on/off that
device from the My N3rd mobile app. Increasingly more such
projects appear on the market with Arduino-based projects
taking the lead. While exciting for users, such devices tend to
inherit the problematic trust model and allow an adversary to
take full control of ones devices.
In our experiments we consider a mobile adversary that tries
to get unauthorized access to the IoT devices. The mobile
adversary can perform an attack from an unauthorized phone,
or from an unauthorized app on an authorized phone 7. To
test the above cases, we use 2 Nexus phones. The first one
is assumed to be untrusted and the second one is assumed to
belong to one of the HAN users. We then tried to access the
target IoT devices using both phones. Unfortunately we found
that the adversary can trivially connect and control all devices.
The video demos of our attacks can be found online [13].
IV. HANGUARD DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we elaborate on our design of Hanguard and
its implementation over HAN and mobile platforms.
A. Design Overview
Adversary model. As mentioned in Section III, IoT devices are
controlled through smartphone apps. These devices are designed
to act blindly on the commands from authorized phones (based
upon their authentication with the HAN router). This treatment
becomes increasingly problematic: while the smartphone may
indeed belong to a rightful user, the applications that it
runs can come from less known places (e.g., third-party app
stores) and less trustworthy developers (e.g., malware authors).
Given smartphone penetration [103], prevalence and ease of
distribution of mobile applications [35], adversaries can now
find their way to the HAN through a legitimate phone with
minimal effort. Moreover—as demonstrated on Section III-B—
given the erroneous threat model of today’s IoT devices,
which trusts all the requests issued from a trusted source (a
router or phone), such malicious applications can easily gain
unauthorized control of IoT devices (e.g. turning on/off an
actuator, or reading the collected data of a sensor).
Thwarting such attacks is inherently hard. A straightforward
solution is to implement a unified security logic in the router,
since traffic from applications to IoT devices goes through it.
However, the router alone does not have enough information
to make any application level access control decisions. One
could resort to traffic fingerprinting techniques to infer the
application generating the traffic. The approach can (1) be
easily evaded by a malware repackaged from an authorized
7Note that the case of an unauthorized app on an unauthorized phone
trivially reduces to the first case we consider.
Fig. 2: Hanguard high level architecture.
app, (2) bring in false alarms and (3) impacts the performance
of the router.
Hanguard is designed to address the issue through bridging
network and application level semantics, binding an app’s
identity to its traffic to enable a fine-grained access control
on IoT devices. In the meantime, it does not modify both
software and hardware of these devices, the operating systems
of smartphones, and does not make assumptions about the
router hardware. For this purpose, our adversary model is
focused on the situation where a malicious app is installed on
a smartphone device authenticated to the HAN. The adversary is
considered to already know the communication protocol used
by the victim IoT. We further assume that the smartphone
hosting the app has not been compromised at the OS or
hardware level, which limits the adversary to the user land, at
the app level. Note that though outside our adversary model,
Hanguard can also provide coarser-grained protection against
guest phones and compromised phones, remote adversaries and
more traditional WiFi attacks. To avoid confusion we discuss
how this can be done separately (Section VI-B).
Idea and architecture. Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of
Hanguard. Our design is partially inspired by software defined
networking (SDN) (see [91] for a survey), which separates the
network traffic (data) from its management (control). In the
meantime, Hanguard is meant to be easily deployed to today’s
HAN. Serving this purpose is a distributed security control
architecture that includes a Controller on a HAN router for
policy enforcement and a Monitor on the user’s phone for
collecting its runtime situation and making access decisions
(which are enforced by the router). To avoid changing the
mobile OS, the Monitor is in the form of a user-space app.
It detects the app making network communication and its
compliance with security policies, and then pushes the access
permit to the router’s Controller through a secure control
channel (Section IV-B). The router utilizes that information
to enforce the policy (Section IV-C): only the traffic with a
permit from the Monitor is allowed to reach IoT devices.
In essence, this design preserves the data channel within
which unmodified information from smartphone apps is propa-
gated to the router, and creates an independent control channel
for security decisions. Such a separation, it comes with obvious
performance benefits: no extra headers to be processed by the
router on a per packet basis in the data channel. It can also
guarantee that control information is always transmitted through
a secure channel, and allows the router to further enforce
policies and ensure, even in periods of heavy congestion, that
security decisions are delivered in a reliable manner. In addition,
our design allows for a clear separation of tasks: the security
policies can be easily managed by the user through a mobile
app interface; the router reduces to simply enforcing the flow
decisions. This keeps the router as simple as possible and
allows for readily updating the security logic with a mere
application upgrade.
Policy Model. Using the SELinux [102] type-enforcement (TE)
scheme, one tags subjects (e.g. processes) with domains and
objects (e.g. files) with types. Then a policy rule can be
written (usually by security experts) that specifies which domain
can access which type. By default all interactions are forbidden
unless a policy rule is in place that allows the interaction.
The same concept was introduced for the Android OS as
well (SEAndroid [109]) where apps are assigned domains and
resources are assigned types 8. In both SELinux and SEAndroid,
one could use the concept of multi-category security (MCS):
MCS allows for tagging a subject and an object with one
or more category tags. When an SELinux policy is enforced,
the system first checks the TE rules to decide whether the
interaction is explicitly allowed. Then, the category check is
applied to determine whether the subject and object also belong
to the same category. Since the MCS check is applied after the
TE check, it can only further restrict security. For example it
can be used to segregate departments in an enterprise setting.
On Android it is used to enforce the multi-user functionality.
Hanguard implements an RBAC (role-based access control)
policy model which leverages type-enforcement and multi-
category security primitives. It uses them in a unique way to
create SELinux-like policy rules, to protect smart-home devices.
However, Hanguard does not need security experts to create
the policies; policies are generated at runtime and transparently
to the user. In particular, the user is only expected to perform
simple mappings between a finite set of IoT apps, IoT devices
and HAN users. Default policies are automatically created at
setup phase to further reduce users’ burden. Hanguard’s access
control model parses such mappings and assigns a category
tag to each app and its respective IoT device. Further, each
IoT device is labeled with a type. Types can be organized
in overlapping groups called domains. Each mobile phone is
assigned a role and each role can be configured to access a
number of domains. For example, the iBaby camera can be
labeled with the type “babyMonitor t”. A domain “cameras d”
can be created to encompass the “babyMonitor t” type device
among others. Lastly, the role of a HAN user’s phone (e.g.
“Adult”) that is supposed to be able to access the cameras, can
be configured as eligible to access the “camera d” domain and
in extend the “babyMonitor t” type device. This is analogous to
the type-enforcement scheme in SELinux which binds processes
8Since version 4.4 SEAndroid is incorporated in enforcing mode on Android
devices
Fig. 3: Hanguard Control Message delivered over TLS: A
control message contains the following information: a hash of
the user credentials (username, password); the phone’s MAC
address; an identifier for the detected flow; the identifier of the
requesting app; the policy version used; and a flag indicating
flow validation/invalidation.
to resources. Here, the relation between the role and the domain
ensures that an untrusted phone (e.g., a visitor’s phone) cannot
touch protected devices and even an authorized phone, once
compromised, cannot communicate with the IoT devices it is
not supposed to talk to (see Section VI). At the same time and
orthogonally to the type-enforcement scheme, the iBaby camera
and its official app, can be assigned the category “iBaby”. The
category here binds a specific app on a phone to the device the
phone is authorized to access. For example, the role “Adult”
can be configured to access the domain “cameras d”; while that
stipulates that the adult’s phone can control the baby cameras,
access is not granted unless the app on her phone and the
actual baby camera that it tries to reach are tagged with the
same category. Note that more than one category tags can be
associated with a domain. This enables the generation of a
policy rule which allows an app (subject) to access multiple
devices (resources) of the same type.
By default, a phone registered with the HAN is assigned
the role “HAN user”, which is allowed to access the “Home”
domain. The latter encompasses every newly installed IoT
device (which is assigned a unique type). However, the access
can only succeed when the app on the phone is given the same
category tag as the device it attempts to reach. Such an app-
device binding is established when the app is used to configure
the device, which is established through a special device, a
phone or a PC, that takes the role of an Admin. This role
can configure the router, register other user phones, access all
domains and update security policies. During a policy update,
new domains, roles and access relations between them can be
generated. The policy model also handles unregistered phones
(e.g., those belonging to visitors), which connect to the Han
as a “Guest”, a role not allowed to interact with the devices
in the “Home” domain.
A security policy is stored on both the phone side and the
router side. Although its enforcement happens on the router,
its compliance check is performed jointly by the router and
the phone. The former ensures that only the authorized phone,
as indicated by its role, can access the domain involving the
device. The latter runs the Monitor to inspect the app and the
target device’s category tags and asks the router to let their
communication flows go through only when the category tags
are the same. This policy model, is extremely flexible and can
instantiate a diverse set of relations between users, applications
and IoT devices. We describe how individual components of
the system work in the follow-up sections.
B. Phone-side Situation Monitoring
In our distributed access-control system, the Monitors are
deployed as user-space apps with limited privileges. They are
aiming at identifying the subject of a communication attempt,
whether the party trying to access an IoT device across the HAN
is an authorized one. Such information is delivered through
a control message to the Controller module running on the
router, informing it the context of the access attempt (since the
router cannot see the app initiating the communication), which
helps the router enforce appropriate security policies. Note
that we designed the system in a way that the workload on
the router is minimized, which is important in maintaining the
performance level needed for serving the whole local network.
More specifically, the Monitor launches at boot time to establish
an ongoing secure connection with the Controller module on
the router. Through the channel, the situation on the phone is
pushed to the router, enabling it to perform a per-flow (instead
of per-packet) access control. Further, the security policies
(Section IV-A) are broken into two parts: the Monitor checks
whether an app is authorized to access a device and asks the
router to enforce its decision, while the router implements a
phone-level policy check as a second line of defense, which
protects the smart-home devices even when a phone is fully
compromised (see Section VI).
The communication between the Monitor and the router goes
through a TLS control channel. The control message delivered
through the channel is in the format illustrated in Figure 3. For
example, it includes a hash of the user credentials (username,
password), the sender phone’s MAC address, an identifier for
the detected flow (IP/port), an identifier for the app making
the request, the policy’s version number and a flag indicating
whether this flow should be allowed or not. The negative flag
is used to invalidate flows (Section IV-C): this happens when
a TCP FIN packet is observed for a TCP flow or when the
target app stopped sending UDP packets with the same flow
signature.
The anatomy of a mobile phone Monitor is depicted on
Figure 4. Every registered phone on the HAN, can be assigned
roles instantiating an RBAC (Role-Based Access Control)
scheme on the router. Furthermore, the phone used to configure
the router is by default designated as the Master Controller
Node (MCN) and every other phone is designated as the
Slave Controller Node (SCN). A HAN user can update the
policy through the Policy Update Manager running in her
phone’s Monitor. A Monitor accepts policy updates only when
it is running on a master node and after verifying its user’s
credentials. A distributed Policy Update Service (see IV-C)
intermediates policy synchronization and replication in the
system. Every connected (reachable) node gets the latest policy
replica as soon as it connects to the network or when there
is an update. Unregistered devices are automatically assigned
the “Guest” role as soon as they connect to the network. Each
Monitor has a local in-memory replica of the policy base,
that allows it to make decisions for its own traffic efficiently,
alleviating the router from further processing. Having the policy
Fig. 4: Hanguard Monitor architecture.
also at the phone side is an important decision in SDN-like
systems since it allows for efficient decision making by the
Monitors, reduces the bandwidth on the control channel and
keeps the routers simple and fast [91]. For example, Monitors
need to only send their per-flow decision to the router instead of
continuously sending all the mobile OS-situation measurements.
In the last case, the number of control messages in the HAN
would exponentially increase while the router would need to
process all the measurements before making a decision, with
severe performance degradation.
Situation awareness on iOS. As mentioned earlier, the
Monitor is designed to find out which app is talking to an
IoT device under protection. Such information, however, is not
directly given to a non-system app on both iOS and Android.
To tackle this we utilize a new iOS capability that allows
developers to proxy network traffic. Once this functionality
is enabled by an app and approved by the user, all network
packets from all apps will traverse the network stack and
instead of being sent through the physical interface to the
remote destination, they end up in a virtual interface (tunnel).
The tunnel will redirect those packets to the proxy app running
the VPN functionality.
iOS offers developers the capability to proxy network traffic
with the NEVPNManager APIs). However, blindly tunneling
apps’ traffic through the VPN is very expensive, often slowing
down the mobile system’s network performance by an order of
magnitude. This workflow is illustrated in Figure 5a: when an
app makes a network call this would entail, for every packet, a
userspace-kernel context switch, traversing the network stack,
trapping the traffic through the tunnel interface and context-
switching to userspace again to deliver the network packets to
the proxying app. Then the proxying app needs to process the
network headers (essentially performing layer 3-4 translations)
and then resending the packet.
Our solution is to utilize the VPN in a unique way: instead
of running the iOS Monitor to proxy the traffic of all apps
(through the NEVPNManager APIs), which is expensive,
requires a remote VPN server and gives little information
about the identity of the app generating traffic, our iOS Monitor
uses the NEPacketTunnel Provider APIs with a per-app
VPN configuration, to tunnel the traffic only from authorized
apps (the official apps of the IoT devices), while leaving all
other traffic outside the tunnel to avoid unnecessary delays.
(a) iOS. (b) Android.
Fig. 5: Traffic Monitoring Workflow.
Furthermore, over the tunnel, our iOS Monitor does not change
the data: it merely acquires packet header information and
forwards the packet to its original destination. The whole
purpose is that through authenticating itself to the Controller
module on the router through TLS and its credentials, the
Monitor informs the router that the flow in the tunnel is
authorized. Other flows towards the IoT devices from the
phone are by default considered illegitimate and will all be
dropped at the router. In this way, we can strike a balance
between the protection of legitimate IoT management traffic
and the performance impact of the security control.
Situation awareness on Android. A straightforward way to
capture traffic from other apps on Android is to follow a
similar process with iOS and utilize the closely equivalent
VPNService [51] API, introduced in Android 4.0. However,
the implementation of VPN on Android is similar to the one
in iOS and would entail similar overheads. To collect the
situation information in a more lightweight manner, Hanguard
leverages side channels on Android an approach which results
in astounding performance benefits.
The Android Monitor we implemented continuously looks
at the procfs file system (see Figure 5b). procfs is a
virtual file system which exposes the current status of an
Android phone’s kernel internal data structures. Particularly the
files proc/net/tcp, proc/net/tcp6, proc/net/udp
and proc/net/udp6 disclose the ongoing TCP and UDP
connections between the phone and a remote destination,
including the source/destination IP addresses of the ongoing
connection and its port numbers, the status of the connection
etc 9. The addresses here can be either IPv4 and IPv6 (with
the suffix “6”). These connections are also associated with a
specific UID that the Monitor can map to an installed app.
To minimize operation overheads, the Monitor does not open
and parse a file for each access. Instead it just checks the
file’s metadata (i.e. the last modified time or mtime in UNIX
terms) to determine whether the file has been changed since
the last visit. A complication here is that Android often fits
an IPv4 address into the IPv6 format before reporting it to
the user. Such an address is automatically captured by the
Monitor and converted back to the IPv4 form. As an example,
consider an app on a phone with an IPv4 address 192.168.1.189
9Note that iOS does not reveal to an app the information about other
processes through its procfs file system. Before iOS 9, one could use the
system call sysctl to access such information. This channel has been closed
since then.
Fig. 6: Hanguard Router Controller Module
that connects to an IoT device with the address 192.168.1.32.
During the app’s runtime, the connection may not show up
in proc/net/tcp but appears inside proc/net/tcp6
instead with 0000000000000000FFFF 0000BD01A8C0
for the source IP and 0000000000000000 FFFF0000200
1A8C0 for the destination. It is clear that the IPv4 address
is enclosed in the 32 least significant bits 10 and the 96
remaining bits are fixed. The Monitor detects the address from
its fixed part and converts the rest to an IPv4 format before
communicating the app’s identity to the router through a control
message. Note that Android suffers from the repackaged apps
problem [122]. To address this the Android Monitor uses a
package’s signature to verify apps claiming the identity of
policy-controlled apps.
C. Router-side Policy Enforcement
The design of the controller module mainly focuses on
synchronizing security policies across all the systems within the
HAN and enforcing these policies on the router, as illustrated
in Figure 6. More specifically, the module maintains a Master
Policy Replica, and runs a Policy Update Service responsible for
updating the policies and distributing them across registered
Monitors. Further, the Controller module introduces a Per-
Flow Decision Cache (PFDC) for keeping the access decisions
(on the app level) pushed by the Monitors, and a Garbage
Collection Service (GCS) for maintaining the cache. It also
hooks on the router’s packet flow for the policy enforcement.
Policy synchronization. It is critical to ensure that all Monitors
have a consistent view of the global policy, otherwise flows
that need to be blocked might be allowed by the router, or
legitimate flows could be blocked. In our system, the MCN
node is allowed to change policies only when the HAN router
can be reached. In particular, the update is pushed to the
router’s Controller module through a write-through model to
update the policies both in volatile and persistent storage.
After a successful update, the Controller module sends an
acknowledgement along with a new policy version number
to the MCN node and pushes the new policies to all other
reachable Monitors. The Monitors then upgrade their local
policy base along to the current version. However, in case a
Monitor is not reachable, it could miss the update. As a result, a
Monitor could allow an app on its phone to access an IoT device
10in little-endian order, presented using four-byte hexadecimals
no longer allowed to access, as the app-level decisions are
made by the Monitor. To tackle this, the Monitors are designed
to asynchronously sense network changes that happen to the
phones through the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission
(for Android): whenever the phone is disconnected from the
network or switched to a different network, the app receives
a notification and as soon as the connection to the router is
restored, it checks the current policy version and performs an
update when necessary. On iOS, this can be done by using the
Reachability callback.
Receiving decisions. As mentioned earlier, app-level access
control on the router relies on the decision made by the
Monitor and delivered to the router through the control channel.
To effectively enforce such a decision on a traffic flow, the
Controller module is designed to efficiently authenticate and
process the control messages from the Monitor to avoid
holding up the legitimate interactions with the target IoT
device. Specifically, the Controller module maintains TLS
connections with the Monitors through a userspace program.
When a decision from a Monitor arrives, the router checks
the policy version and the sender user’s credentials, and once
validated, passes the decision’s flow ID (source IP and port,
destination IP and port) to the kernel that updates the PFDC
using the flow ID as the key to record the validation/invalidation
decision on the flow, which is then enforced by the router. Note
that the flow id is used for efficient app-level enforcement.
However, data flows are first checked against a phone-level
policy which ensures that the flow comes from a valid HAN
phone (see Section VI).
Supporting this decision-making process requires an efficient
userspace to kernel communication mechanism (for the router).
Although this can be achieved through system calls,
ioctl calls or procfs files, these approaches are either
complicated to implement or unable to handle asynchronous
interactions. Our solution employs the netlink socket IPC
mechanism for the user-kernel communication, which can be
easily built (without changing the kernel) and are asynchronous
in nature: it queues incoming messages and notifies the receiver
through a handler callback. In our implementation, the callback
spawns a worker thread that processes the message and updates
the PFDC, either by inserting a valid flow or removing an
invalid flow.
The PFDC is loaded at the router’s boot time from its
persistent storage. It holds the following information per-flow:
the flow ID, the flow validation/invalidation flag, the requesting
app and the data last seen time. This cache is used for enforcing
app-level policies (whether a specific app is allowed to access a
device), for the purpose of enhancing the existing flow-control
capability of the router, which cannot differentiate two flows
from the same IP and port but produced by different apps. By
searching the cache, the router can apply the app-level access
decision upon the whole flow, instead for every individual
packet, an advantage over deep packet inspection and traffic
fingerprinting techniques. To limit the amount of the resource
the cache uses (given that the router is a resource-limited
device), a Garbage Collector Service (GCS) is run to remove
the obsolete records with the oldest data last seen time. Also, a
per-phone limit is applied to prevent a Monitor from using too
much resource of the cache. Note that this is a measure against
DoS. Flow invalidation decisions are made by the Monitors.
Enforcement. The router enforces phone-level and app-level
policies. For the former, it checks every packet to determine
whether it originates from a phone that is allowed to access a
particular IoT device. Phones and IoT devices are identified
based on their MAC addresses. For the latter it checks with
the PFDC cache to determine whether the flow is generated
from a valid app.
A technical challenge in implementing the protection is
where to place the security control within the existing router
infrastructure. On a Linux-enabled system used by the router,
once a packet is received, it is put by the link layer into
a backlog queue from which the IP layer pulls packets for
checksum checking and routing decisions. If the packet is
destined for the current machine, it is then passed to the
transport layer. If not the packet is forwarded. Apparently,
the security control should happen on the IP layer (e.g. in the
ip_forward() function). However, a packet might follow
a different path within the kernel depending on whether the
current system is configured to run as a bridge or a router. For
example, in a bridge mode, no layer 3 operation is involved
and as a result the aforementioned function will never operate
on the packet. Our solution is to place the Controller hook
in dev_queue_xmit(), a generic driver function, which
ensures that no packet bypasses the check.
To minimize the impact on the communication unrelated to
the smart-home devices, the Hanguard-enhanced router quickly
inspects each packet it receives to determine whether further
attention is needed. Specifically, a TCP flow is considered
interesting if its destination MAC address is associated with a
protected IoT device. Packets not fitting this description are
forwarded on without a delay, and others are first handled
according to the phone-level policy (whether the phone can
access the IoT device) stored at the router, and then the app-
level policy (whether the app can do that) which is based
upon the validation flag set by the Monitor. For the packet
allowed to go through, its flow’s last seen time is updated
to the packet’s arrival time. Hanguard helps its users detect
and react to spurious access attempts with its notification
mechanism: Hanguard (1) keeps a log, and (2) sends out-
of-band notifications to the admin user when a violation or
tampering of the policy is attempted.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We implemented a prototype of Hanguard on top of a TP-
Link WDR4300v1 router with a gigabit NIC and a wireless
network at the 2.4 GHz band (300Mbps) running OpenWRT
Chaos Chalmer with a Linux 4.1.16 kernel, and also Nexus
phones running Android 5 (Lollipop) and an iPhone 4S running
iOS 9. Our work answers the following research questions:
• RQ1: Is Hanguard effective in thwarting attacks from
malicious applications?
• RQ2: What is the performance impact and resource con-
sumption of the Monitors on the phone side?
• RQ3: What is the overall overhead of our system?
A. Effectiveness
To answer RQ1 and verify Hanguard’s backward compati-
bility and its practicality, we performed attacks on real world
smart-home devices, including a Belkin WeMo switch, a Belkin
WeMo in.sight A1.C, a Belkin WeMo motion and a My N3rd
device. The first two devices allow the user to connect them to
any other electronic devices, which then the user can turn on/off
through her WeMo app. The Belkin WeMo motion notifies the
WeMo app when motion is detected. The My N3rd device can
be connected to any other device, enabling remote control of
it through the My N3rd app.
Hypothesis. A malicious app on a HAN user phone might try
to take advantage of the fact that the phone’s role is allowed
to access the domain of the target IoT device. However,
the Monitor on that phone, will detect the offending flow
and determine that the source application has a category
different than the one of the target device. Thus it will not
push a flow decision to the router, which means the packets
on the data plane for that flow will be dropped by the router.
Experimental Setting. We performed the following two
experiments. (A) First we set up the target IoT devices over
the “Vanilla” system (without Hanguard components), and
further installed a repackaged version of their legitimate app
on the phone to mimic the adversary. (B) Next, we updated
the router with Hanguard-enhanced firmware, and also put our
Monitor app on the same phone. Under this protected setting,
we repeated the experiment (A), using the phone with the
Monitor app to set up the IoT devices.
Results. During experiment (A), we found that both the official
and the repackaged app on the first phone could see and
interact with the target IoT devices. However, during experiment
(B)—with our system in place—only the official app on the
phone running the Monitor app could communicate with the
IoT device and any other attempt was successfully blocked.
We conducted the above experiments on all devices listed in
Table I, which confirms the effectiveness of the access control
enforced by Hanguard and its backward compatibility. Demos
of Hanguard’s success are posted on the project’s website [13].
B. Phone-side Performance
To answer RQ2, we focused on the overheads introduced
by the Monitor to the phone.
Monitoring cost on Android. On Android, the Monitor contin-
uously polls the procfs file system to detect ongoing network
connections. Here we report our study on two monitoring
strategies and their performance impacts. Specifically, we
configured the Android Monitor on a Nexus phone to inspect
the procfs file system in different granularity (every 5ms,
(a) Android Monitor polling sched-
uled frequency vs Actual polling
frequency.
(b) File lines parsed for different
Android Monitor configurations.
(c) Battery Power on Android. (d) CPU Load on Android and
iOS(*).
Fig. 7: Monitoring Costs.
10ms, 20ms, 30ms, 100ms). After running for 30 seconds,
the Monitor went through every single file line to check the
presence of interesting network connections, a strategy called
the Naive mode. The approach was compared with another
strategy, called the Smarter mode, which first looked at the
last modified time of a file before accessing its content. The
outcomes of the study are illustrated in Figure 7a. As we can
see, the Smarter strategy clearly can poll at a finer granularity
(5 ms), given that it reads much fewer file lines compared with
the Naive approach (Figure 7b), which is translated to less
work per iteration in the common case.
We further looked into the resource consumption of the
Monitor. For this purpose, we configured the Monitor to poll
at 10 ms and recorded its CPU and battery consumption for
both the Naive and Smarter mode. On the same Nexus 5
phone, we also ran Trepn [50] by Qualcomm to collect the
baseline power profile of the phone for 30 seconds before
running our Monitor app for 2 minutes. Figure 7c illustrates
the average battery consumption that can be attributed to the
Monitor, and Figure 7d shows the average CPU usage (first 4
bars). To put things into perspective, we compared our Monitor
with a popular Antivirus app in scanning mode and the de
facto mailing app on Android (Gmail). As we can see from
the figures, the power consumption of the naive approach
is comparable to an antivirus app performing an expensive
operation while the smarter mode’s is comparable with Gmail
which is optimized to always run in the background.
Monitoring cost on iOS. To evaluate the iOS Monitor’s
resource consumption, we used Instruments [19], a performance
analysis and testing tool which is part of the official Apple IDE
(Xcode [55]). Figure 7d depicts the % CPU utilization that
can be attributed to a runtime process, where measurements
on iOS are indicated with * (last 3 bars): the Monitor when
proxying a TCP app that sends 500 messages with payload
size equal to one character; the Monitor when proxying an
equivalent UDP app; and YouTube while streaming a video
configured to auto-select its quality. The figure reflects the
fact that the iOS Monitor does a lot of work when proxying
TCP traffic: this is expected as TCP is a connection oriented
protocol and the Monitor needs to guarantee reliable delivery
of the packets. For UDP the Monitor does very little work.
In idle mode (not proxying), the Monitor incurred no CPU
overhead. Instruments can also report the Energy Use Level of
an app at runtime as a value from 0 to 20. In all experiments
the reported value was consistently 0/20.
Decision Latency. Our Monitor is designed to detect an
interesting outgoing connection (or its termination) and notify
the router if the connection is allowed by the policy. By the
time the data packet from the legitimate app reaches the router,
the Controller module needs to have such information available.
Otherwise it drops the packet, forcing the TCP layer to retry or
the UDP application layer to handle the event. 11 To quantify the
impact of the possible delay (the control message arriving later
than data packets), we measured the time difference between
the first data packet arrival at the Controller Module’s enforcing
point and the moment the decision for that flow is stored in
the Controller Modules’s flow table (PFDC). We call our new
metric the decision latency. In the experiment, we ran a custom
app (simulating an authorized IoT app) on the Nexus phone,
sending packets of payload of 1 character to a TCP server on
a PC connected to the router through Ethernet.
On Android the experiment was performed with the Monitor
running in the Smarter mode (with a polling interval of 10, 30
and 100ms respectively). We repeated the experiment 10 times
for each interval and report our findings in Figure 8. Note that,
since the control message and the flow packets leave the same
device almost simultaneously, it is possible for the control
message to arrive earlier at the Controller module than the flow
packet (see the negative values in Figure 8). As we can see
from the figure, the decision latency does not depend on how
fast we poll at the Monitor. Other factors, such as link latency
and congestion at the router dominate. Also note that this is a
one-time cost: once the decision is stored, the router no longer
has to wait for it again for other packets in the same flow. On
iOS, the decision latency is more predictable. This is because
every packet of the target app is routed by the OS through the
Monitor. Thus, both the decision and the data packet are send in
a more deterministic way. Nonetheless, similarly with Android,
the decision is sent through a different channel, which in
combination with the router’s different treatment of packets to
be forwarded compared with packets destined for its userspace,
might cause the data and control packets to be stored and
11Note that during our manual analysis, we found that the studied devices
consistently use TCP or other higher-level protocols build on top of it.
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Fig. 8: Decision latency for (a) Android and (b) iOS.
Fig. 9: TCP and UDP flow detection accuracy for different
Android Monitor configurations (10ms, 30ms, 100ms, 150ms)
and for the iOS Monitor.
analyzed respectively by the router in a different order than
their sending order.
Detection accuracy. The Monitor’s goal is to detect an
interesting flow generated on the phone. For iOS the detection
accuracy is 100% since all packets from interesting apps are
routed through the VPN the Monitor runs. For the Android
Monitor though, the situation is more complicated. For example,
an interesting app might quickly set up a socket, send a packet
and then close the connection. The Android Monitor’s detection
accuracy depends on whether it can catch such events given its
polling interval. To answer this question we created a micro-
benchmark that includes a TCP and a UDP app connecting to
a TCP and UDP echo server respectively. They both stop the
communication once the server response is received. Again,
we ran the Monitor in the Smarter mode 10 times for each of
the following polling configurations: 150ms, 100ms, 30ms and
10ms. We found (see Figure 9) that the 10ms configuration
could always detect outgoing TCP and UDP connections.
C. Communication Overhead
To answer RQ3, we performed experiments to illustrate the
overall performance overhead of Hanguard, as this can be
observed from a target mobile app. We further evaluate the
router’s performance in handling non-interesting traffic given
the Hanguard security enhancements. We created a baseline by
performing our experiments below on the unmodified system
(Vanilla). To evaluate Hanguard communication overheads we
repeated the experiments with the respective benchmark app
not being policy-protected (Unmanaged), and being protected
(Managed).
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Fig. 10: Application-level communication latency.
Application latency. We ran the TCP and UDP apps individu-
ally, configured to send 100 messages each. Figure 10a depicts
the mean latency in milliseconds (ms) for a TCP message and
a UDP message for Android. The latency is measured as round
trip time (RTT) on the mobile app. In particular we measured
the time interval between the API call to send the message
and the time that the message is returned by the server and
delivered to the application layer. As we can observe, Hanguard
introduces negligible latency for Managed apps on Android.
In Figure 10b we can see that there is a big increase on TCP
packet latency for the Managed apps on iOS. Nevertheless,
in practice this is often tolerable, since most devices are
actuators and sensors that create mice flows 12 delivering a
small amount of information: for example, it is completely
imperceptible when the delay for switching a light grows from
a few milliseconds to tens of milliseconds. This Figure also
reveals an important benefit of our design: the security controls
have negligible impact on Unmanaged apps, on both Android
and iOS devices, for both UDP and TCP.
Application throughput. To measure Hanguard’s throughput
overhead, we use our benchmark apps to transmit a file of
20MB to their server counterparts. We have repeated the
experiment 10 times and in Figure 11 we plot the CDF of the
throughput for Android and iOS (*). Evidently, Hanguard has
negligible impact on throughput for the Android apps and iOS
unmanaged apps. Our evaluation also reveals an interesting
case: throughput drops significantly for the iOS Managed apps.
This happens because the iOS Monitor implementation uses
the built in VPN utility of the OS. Thus, it has to inspect every
packet for managed apps (see Figure 5a). This is a security,
performance trade-off we had to address. We opted in for
security. Nonetheless, this will not affect performance of most
managed apps in practice: most devices are simple actuators and
sensors; the performance penalty will only affect protected iOS-
device communications involving real-time streaming services
through the HAN. Since obviously this is an edge case,
one could handle it differently. For example, when a HAN
iOS communicates with such a service, the Monitor could
opportunistically intercept traffic instead of checking every
packet. Alternatively, in a less security stringent policy, real-
time streaming services could get only phone-level protection
12A mouse flow is a flow with a short number of total bytes sent on the
network link.
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Fig. 11: Application-level throughput (TCP).
which will eliminate all iOS overheads.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. App-level Attack Scenarios
Access from unauthorized HAN user phone. An app on an
unauthorized HAN user phone might attempt to access an IoT
device. Even if the app’s category matches the IoT device’s
category, the Monitor on that phone will detect the outgoing
flow and determine that the host phone’s role cannot access
the domain which encompasses the target IoT device. Thus it
will not push a flow decision to the router for that app and
packets on the data plane for that flow will be dropped by the
router.
Access from unauthorized app on an authorized HAN user
phone. (a) A malicious app on a HAN user phone might try
to take advantage of the phone rights and access an IoT device.
However, the Monitor on that phone, will detect that the source
application has a category different than the target device. Thus
it will not push a flow decision to the router, and the malicious
packets will be dropped by the router. (b) A repackaged app
on Android could use the same package name as a Hanguard
category-tagged app. However, the Android Monitor uses the
package signature) to verify an Android app. Therefore, the
Monitor detects the discrepancy, notifies the user and does not
authorize the data flow.
B. Beyond the app-level adversary
WPA2-PSK authentication and Hanguard network parti-
tion. On a typical WLAN node, once a subnetwork is created
it can be configured to use a Service Set Identifier (SSID)
and the WPA2-PSK security protocol. WPA2-PSK derives a
unique pairwise transient key to encrypt the communication
traffic between individual nodes on a HAN and the router.
However, all keys are derived from the same SSID and a
secret passphrase shared across all the nodes. As a result, a
compromised phone could potentially use the key to directly
connect to an IoT device, bypassing the router-level protection.
To address this threat, Hanguard partitions the HAN into two
default subnetworks, each with their own SSID/passphrase pair,
one for user phones, PCs and laptops, and the other for IoT
devices. This ensures that even a fully compromised phone
cannot acquire the secret key used by smart-home devices.
Access from unauthorized authenticated guest phone. (a)
A guest phone’s role is only allowed to access the unprotected
domain. If the target IoT device’s type is in another domain,
the router will reject the offending packets. (b) A guest phone
might try to claim the identity of one of the HAN Monitor’s to
alter the policy rules. Since the guest phones are in a different
local network and use different keys, the router will not accept
rules from those phones. Further, a guest phone will not be
able to authenticate to the router controller module, since it
lacks both the client certificate and the user credentials. Lastly,
Hanguard uses static IPs associated with phones/devices MAC
addresses during setup by the admin role. Any attempt to claim
a reserved IP (arp-spoofing) or MAC address (MAC-spoofing)
is validated through the control channel and the admin user is
notified out-of-band.
Compromised HAN user phones. In this case, Hanguard can
still guarantee phone-level access control. (a) The phone might
attempt to surreptisiously access an IoT device. Assuming it
acquires the user credentials and the Monitor certificate, it can
try to push a rule to the router to allow its flow. However, the
router detects that the rule comes from a device whose role is
not allowed to access the type of the target device. It rejects the
rule and notifies the admin user. (b) The phone might attempt
to update the policy in its favor. An attempted policy update
by a non-admin device will be rejected and the admin will be
notified. Even if the admin device and its user credentials are
compromised and a policy update is pushed, the admin user
will be notified. Thus she can revoke the update and take action.
(c) The phone, might try to flood the flow decision cache. This
would force the GCS service to retire older flows, essentially
invalidating benign flows and causing denial of service. To
tackle this, we rate limit the flows a particular device can create.
If that limit is surpassed, the device is penalized by having
the router dropping all its packets for a few minutes. During
that time, no flow entries will be added in the decision cache
originating from that device. Furthermore, Hanguard triggers
its notification mechanism.
Remote adversary. Commonly, an IoT device behind the
NAT initiates a connection to its cloud, through which the
cloud learns the device’s external IP and port. However, if this
information is exposed to an unauthorized party, that party
can gain unfettered access to the device [42], [85], [95], [106].
To shut down this exploitable channel, Hanguard by default
configures the router to a port-restricted cone NAT,
which ensures that only the flows from the remote IP/port pairs
contacted before by a local device can reach that device. Note
that this NAT mode is supported by most smart-home devices
on the market [29], [28], [52], [48].
VII. DISCUSSION
HAN users smartphones OS integrity. Our application-
level enforcement assumes that HAN user phones are not
compromised. Preventing phone compromises is out of the
scope of this work since other solutions already exist and
even deployed on commodity smartphones [96], [117], [120],
[56], [62], [58]. For example, SELinux for Android [110] uses
mandatory access control to ensure that even compromised
system processes are restricted, and is deployed on all Android
phones with version 4.4. and higher (more than 60% in
2015 [44]). Most Android phones are equipped with ARM
processors [57] with TrustZone [56] which can be utilized for
solutions stemming from the trusted computing domain. TZ-
RKP [62] is a real-time kernel protection technique deployed on
Samsung Galaxy phones that ensures the kernel integrity using
the ARM TrustZone secure world. iOS devices have the Secure
Enclave, a secure co-processor that is used to guarantee secure
boot [58]. However, even if a user device is compromised
(and in the case of all guest phones), Hanguard can guarantee
phone-level protection (Section VI-B). Furthermore, Hanguard
helps its users detect spurious access attempts by (1) keeping
a log, (2) sending out-of-band notifications to the admin user
when a violation of the policy is attempted.
Switching Between Information Gathering Approaches.
iOS follows a far more stringent approach than Android in
isolating processes. In fact our Android solution for traffic
monitoring does not work on iOS. Instead we utilize Apple’s
NEPacketTunnel Provider API with a per-app VPN
configuration. The latter requires an MDM (Mobile Device
Management) server: the router vendor will need to enrol their
users’ iOS devices and push an over-the-air (OTA) configuration
profile on the phone, just like the cell phone carriers (e.g.
AT&T, T-mobile e.t.c.) do. This process is already mature and
streamlined for users who just need to accept the configuration.
Apple does offer the non-enterprise NEVPNManager API but
that would entail Hanguard iOS Monitors proxying traffic
not only from a selected set of apps but from all apps,
imposing the overheads we demonstrate in Section V for both
unmanaged and managed apps. In our prototype we opted for
security and runtime performance in the expense of an initial
bootstrapping usability burden, that allows us to selectively
proxy traffic only from a handful of apps when used in the
HAN environment. Our work illustrates how such capabilities
can facilitate novel solutions on the iOS platform. Also note
that any of the two aforementioned techniques can be used
in practice with Hanguard iOS Monitors. Hanguard’s design,
allows router vendors to readily switch between monitoring
techniques with a mere application update. Similarly, if access
to the Android procfs as a whole is forbidden in the future
(not a straightforward decision since this would break a lot of
legitimate apps), Hanguard can switch to a VPNService-based
Android Monitor by merely pushing an app update.
Communication through cloud. Some apps still go through
the cloud during the communication phase, even if they are
on the same HAN as the device. Hanguard’s RBAC can be
applied to those apps as well by extending the NAT checks.
In particular the Monitors can detect an app on a user phone
contacting its respective cloud service and notify the router.
Using the traditional port-restricted cone NAT, Hanguard allows
the traffic from validated external IoT domains to reach their
respective IoT devices as long as the connection was initiated
from the IoT device itself. In this case, Hanguard can further
utilize the information received from the Monitor, and allow
the remote traffic only if the following also hold true: (a) the
role of the phone generated the traffic to the device’s IoT cloud
is allowed by the policy to access that device, (b) the category
of the app matches the category of the target IoT device and,
(c) the traffic came within a time limit since the receipt of
the control message (e.g. 1 sec). The last is needed to tackle
the fact that someone could try to bypass the system while an
accepted role also sent a remote command.
VIII. RELATED WORK
IoT attacks. Recent works have demonstrated attacks on IoT
devices [121], [114], [100], [108], [75], [107]. Fernandes et.al.
found vulnerabilities on SmartThings’ applications [75]. Their
work focuses on a specific IoT hub that can integrate third-
party IoT devices. Our work presents a solution applicable to
an infrastructure that exists in almost all households with IoT
devices. [114], [100], revealed vulnerabilities on the Philips
Insight, iBaby baby cameras and Belkin devices. However they
consider an adversary on a separate device. [107] considers an
intricate mobile adversary which colludes with a cloud. We
illustrate that the mobile adversary can succeed with minimal
effort. All reported attacks further motivate the need for
practical smart-home defenses.
Side-channels on Android and network monitors. Several
works focused on acquiring information for other processes
using side-channels on Android [123], [125], [84], [121]. [121]
also utilized side channel information for defence purposes,
avoiding system-level modifications. [92] used the VPN service
on Android for passive monitoring of a selected set of mobile
apps to collect user traffic information for analysis. However, it
redirects all packets to a server that further routes the packets.
This entails privacy concerns which we avoid by implementing
the routing functionality locally.
Access control. There have been various works on home access
control which we classify in three major areas: surveys [79],
[118], [73]; access control systems [59], [71], [89], [94], [108],
[76]; and user studies for usable policy specifications [90],
[97]. More relevant to our work is the second. Nonetheless,
most of these systems assume a clean-slate design where the
OSes of participating nodes can be modified. Our solution
is backward compatible: it requires just a software upgrade
on the Home’s router and downloading an app on the phone.
Other work focused on access control enforced on the mobile
phones [111], [64], [72]. Demetriou et. al. [72] enforced local
policies to control access to personal devices while our target
is to enforce a distributed policy on shared devices.
IDS and Firewalls. Work on intrusion detection systems (IDS),
personal and application firewalls [70], [86], [60], [67], focuses
either solely at the host or at a network node, or only at the
network layer. Our solution works in a distributed manner,
consolidating application level semantics from hosts, and
network level information from the network node. Furthermore,
we do not require experts to set up policies.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented Hanguard, a system that can
enforce access control policies in a HAN among user phones
and IoT devices. Hanguard uses a new software-defined net-
working (SDN) approach applied on home area networks using
mobile phones as monitors: it employs situation awareness on
users’ phones through a userspace Monitor app that detects
whether an authorized app is establishing a network flow with
a target IoT device; Monitors push decisions to the HAN
router bridging the gap between network and application-level
semantics. This technique allows the router to enforce fine-
grained access control based on a global policy protecting
access to HAN IoT devices. Hanguard does not require mobile
OSes modifications, any IoT device modifications, or new
router hardware. It is backward compatible with the existing
HAN infrastructure, and was implemented and evaluated in
a realistic HAN setting, verifying both its practicality and
effectiveness.
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X. APPENDIX A: IOT APPS STUDY
A. IoT Product Functionality Categorization Summary
On Section III-A we have elaborated our strategy for
analyzing the existing state of IoT products. Here we provide
a detailed categorization of our functionality categorization.
On Figure 1a we depict the overall categorization of 353 IoT
products listed on iotlist.co, on Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 a further
sub-categorization for the “Wearables”, “Home Security”,
“Home Automation / Appliances” and “Home Entertainment”
categories respectively.
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Fig. 12: Wearables functionality sub-categorization.
B. IoT HAN Trust Model Study
As the IoT industry matures, more and more devices add
local WiFi connections to avoid the cloud availability require-
ment and unnecessary latency. In our work we compared the
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Fig. 13: Home Security product functionality sub-
categorization.
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Fig. 14: Home Automation / Appliances product functionality
sub-categorization.
authentication practices of IoT vendors when cloud connection
is attempted vs when a local WiFi connection is attempted.
App Selection. Our IoT product collection (see Section III)
resulted in 223 products having apps on Google Play. However,
a lot of apps can control multiple products. For example, the
WeMo app can control at least three Belkin WeMo products.
In particular, we found 92 unique Android apps on Google
Play. Note also that part of these 92 apps, are apps that control
wearables such as smartwatches and fitness trackers. Thus we
manually went through the 92 apps and selected only those
that connect to smart-home devices. This resulted in 55 unique
smart-home apps. Our collection is conservative: while it does
not yield a complete set of smart-home Android apps, it ensures
that the selected apps are related to WiFi smart-home devices.
This is important since our null hypothesis is specific to devices
that connect to the HAN.
App Analysis. See Section III-B.
Results. Unfortunately, we found that smart-home apps tend
to trust the local environment which exposes them to attacks
from mobile adversaries—9/22 (41%) apps with local WiFi
connectivity perform no authentication when in the HAN.
Table II lists the 55 IoT systems we examined for our statistical
significance test. This highlights the need for a solution which
is independent of IoT vendors and application developers
practices. Hanguard on top of its role-based management
capabilities, also offers protection for IoT devices.
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Fig. 15: Home Entertainment product functionality sub-
categorization.
TABLE II: IoT apps selected for trust model analysis. Y = YES; N = NO; ? = Undetermined.
No PACKAGE NAME CATEGORY # Installations DECOMPILED OBFUSCATED LOCAL WIFI LOCAL AUTH
1 is.yranac.canary TOOLS 100K - 500K N - - -
2 com.netgear.android VIDEO PLAYERS &EDITORS 100K - 500K Y N N -
3 com.homeboy LIFESTYLE 1K - 5K Y N N -
4 com.belkin.android.androidbelkinnetcam VIDEO PLAYERS &EDITORS 100K - 500K Y N Y Y
5 com.petcube.android LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N N -
6 com.blacksumac.piper LIFESTYLE 50K - 100K Y N Y Y
7 ibabymonitor.main TOOLS 10K - 50K Y N Y ?
8 com.philips.cl.insight LIFESTYLE 50K - 100K Y Y Y ?
9 com.chamberlain.myq.chamberlain LIFESTYLE 100K - 500K Y N N -
10 com.garageio TOOLS 1K - 5K Y N N -
11 com.skybell LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N N -
12 com.orvibo.kepler LIFESTYLE 1K - 5K Y N N -
13 com.kornersafe.secure.igg LIFESTYLE 1K - 5K Y N N -
14 com.lifx.lifx LIFESTYLE 100K - 500K Y Y Y N
15 com.philips.lighting.hue LIFESTYLE 500K - 1M Y Y Y N
16 com.allure energy.esmobile TOOLS 1K - 5K Y N N -
17 com.honeywell.mobile.android.totalComfort LIFESTYLE 500K - 1M Y N N -
18 com.ecobee.athenamobile LIFESTYLE 50K - 100K Y N N -
19 com.honeywell.android.lyric TOOLS 10K - 50K Y N N -
20 com.wirelesstag.android3 TOOLS 1K - 5K Y N N -
21 com.tado TOOLS 10K - 50K Y N N -
22 com.albahra.sprinklers TOOLS 5K - 10K Y N Y Y
23 com.iconservo.blossom LIFESTYLE 1K - 5K Y N N -
24 com.skydrop.app TOOLS 5K - 10K Y N N -
25 com.hydrawise.android2 2 PRODUCTIVITY 5K - 10K Y N N -
26 com.rachio.iro LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N N -
27 be.smappee.mobile.android LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N N -
28 com.smart me TOOLS 1K - 5K Y N ? -
29 com.eyesight.singlecue ENTERTAINMENT 1K - 5K Y Y Y ?
30 com.amazon.dee.app MUSIC & AUDIO 1M - 5M Y N N -
31 com.myn3rd.n3rdremote TOOLS 500 - 1K Y N Y N
32 com.sensibo.app TOOLS 5K - 10K Y N N -
33 net.wifisocket.advancedlumonicslabs LIFESTYLE 100 - 500 Y N ? -
34 us.hiku.android.app SHOPPING 1K - 5K Y Y ? -
35 com.dnm.heos.phone MUSIC & AUDIO 100K - 500K Y Y ? -
36 com.musaic.musaiccontrol MUSIC & AUDIO 1K - 5K Y N Y ?
37 com.beep.android MUSIC & AUDIO 1K - 5K Y N Y N
38 com.wifiaudio MUSIC & AUDIO 5K - 10K Y Y Y N
39 com.roku.remote ENTERTAINMENT 5M - 10M Y Y Y N
40 org.qtproject.example.EzeeSync VIDEO PLAYERS &EDITORS 100 - 500 Y N ? -
41 com.insteon.insteon3 LIFESTYLE 50K - 100K Y N Y ?
42 com.lutron.mmw LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N Y Y
43 com.osram.lightify LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N Y N
44 com.scoutalarm.android TOOLS 1K - 5K Y N N -
45 com.syabas.iot.iotmobile.android LIFESTYLE 500 - 1K Y N N -
46 com.alyt.lytmobile LIFESTYLE 500 - 1K Y N Y ?
47 iSA.common TOOLS 10K - 50K Y N Y N
48 com.wigwag.wigwag mobile LIFESTYLE 100 - 500 N - - -
49 com.irisbylowes.iris.i2app LIFESTYLE 10K - 50K Y N N -
50 com.webee.mywebee LIFESTYLE 1K - 5K Y N N -
51 com.codeatelier.homee.smartphone PRODUCTIVITY 5K - 10K Y N Y ?
52 com.zonoff.diplomat.staples LIFESTYLE 5K - 10K Y Y Y ?
53 com.revolv.android.app - - NOT FOUND - - -
54 com.amazon.storm.lightning.client.aosp TOOLS 1M - 5M Y N Y ?
55 com.belkin.wemoandroid LIFESTYLE 100K - 500K Y N Y N
